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RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NOTES-STOLEN GOVERNMENT BONDS
APPLICABLE LAW-BURDEN
OF PROOF.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n. v. Rocco (3d Cir. 1955).
An action was brought to recover the value of bearer bonds of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which were guaranteed as to principal
and interest by the United States Government. The bonds were allegedly
stolen by the defendent Rocco from the plaintiff bank, presented by the
defendant Parnell to the defendant First National Bank of Indiana, Indi-
ana, Pennsylvania, and by it forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. The bonds had been issued in 1934, called for redemption in
1944, and were negotiated by the defendants in 1948. The Federal Reserve
Bank cashed the bonds, paid First National Bank of Indiana, and it in
turn paid Parnell who turned the money over to Rocco. At the end of the
plaintiff's case, the action as to the Federal Reserve Bank was dismissed.
The trial was conducted on the theory that the rights of the parties and the
burden of proof were governed by state rather than federal law. Judgment
was entered against the First National Bank of Indiana and Parnell. On
appeal the court of appeals reversed and held that the giving of instructions
that the burden of proving lack of notice and want of good faith was on
defendants was reversible error. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say.
Ass'n. v. Rocco, 226 F. 2d 297 (3d Cir. 1955). 1
The calling c' United States Government bonds operates only to stop
the running of interest; it does not mature them so as to make them over-
due thereafter.2 A bona fide purchaser of bonds before due will be pro-
tected in his ownership of them notwithstanding want of title in the seller.3
However, when the bonds have been shown to be stolen the applicable state
law, in this case the Negotiable Instruments Law, 4 would place on the holder
the burden of showing a bona fide purchase. 5 The federal law, on the other
1. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n. v. Rocco, 226 F.2d 297 (3d Cir.
1955).
2. Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). But cf. Smyth v. United States,
302 U.S. 329 (1937) (dictum).
3. Murray v Lardner, 69 U.S.(2 Wall.) 110 (1864).
4. The operative facts in the case occurred prior to the enactment by Pennsylvania
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
5. "Every holder is deemed, prima facie, to be a holder in due course, but when it
is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective,
the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims
acquired the title as holder in due course. But the last mentioned rule does not apply
in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of
such defective title. Act of 1901, May 16, P.L. 194, ch.I, art. I, § 139.
(344)
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RECENT DECISIONS
hand, would put the burden of proving notice and bad faith of a holder of a
negotiable instrument on the claimant. 6 Since the decision in Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins the federal courts apply the substantive law of the state wherein
they are sitting where diversity is the basis of federal jurisdiction. 7 But
when necessary or appropriate in dealing with essentially federal matters,
the federal judicial power to deal with common-law problems remains un-
impaired.8 Therefore, the Erie decision did not bring within state law
questions of federal power and relations requiring uniform national dis-
position rather than diversified state rulingsY Thus, there remains an area
of federal common law untouched by the Erie decision.10 In choosing the
applicable federal rule the state law has sometimes been applied." In the
absence of an overriding federal policy 12 state law may be applied, es-
pecially where it furnishes "convenient solutions in no way inconsistent
with adequate protection of the federal interest." 13 But when the rights of
the transferee constitute the only issue, they are determined by reference
to the place where the transaction occured. 14
The decision in the instant case turns on whether federal or state law
is to be applied; the choice of law is the choice of outcome. Believing that
the rights of a transferee of government bonds flow from the nature and
character of those bonds the court of appeals has chosen to apply the
federal standard of burden of proof on the strength of the Clearfield 15
case, bolstered by the decision in National Metropolitan Bank v. United
States.16 While the basis of jurisdiction appears to be diversity of citizen-
ship, the mandate of the Erie case is presumably avoided by viewing the
situation as one requiring uniformity under the rule of Clearfield. To do so
ignores the fact that we are not concerned with the terms of the contract
but rather with the defense of the First National Bank in Indiana that it
6. "The burden of proof lies on the person who assails the right claimed by the
party in possession." Murray v. Lardner, 69 U.S.(2 Wall.) 110, 121 (1864). Accord,
Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885), Texas v. White, 74 U.S.(7 Wall.) 700
(1868), Swift. v. Tyson, 41 U.S.(16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
7. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). None of the opinions examined
the pertinent question of whether the burden of proof is really a matter of substanue
rather than procedure.
8. United States v. Standard Oil Corp., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
9. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-368 (1943), (when
dealing with the rights and duties on United States' commercial paper the need for
uniformity of treatment requires the application of federal law to the nature of the
obligation and to the transactions involving such commercial paper.)
10. Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939) ; Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190 (1940); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941);
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942); United
States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) ; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946).
11. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
12. RFC v. United Distillers' Products Corp., 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2372 (2d Cir. Feb.
7, 1956).
13. See note 8, supra.
14. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934).
15. See note 11, supra.
16. 323 U.S. 454 (1945).
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is a holder in due course. Since this defense grows out of the circumstances
of the transfer it is to be determined by the law of the place of the trans-
fer.'7 When the only question is the rights of a transferee of a negotiable
instrument it is immaterial that the instrument is a government bond. When
the rights of the United States are not involved, the application of federal
law to insure uniformity of decision respecting the obligations of the
United States is not required.
Joseph R. McDonald
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PROHIBITING TESTIMONY OF
FEDERAL OFFICERS IN STATE COURTS.
Rea v. United States (U.S. 1956).
The petitioner was indicted under a federal statute for the unlawful
acquisition of marihuana based on evidence obtained by a federal narcotics
agent acting under a search warrant issued by a United States Com-
missioner. On a motion by the petitioner, the district court suppressed the
evidence on the grounds that the warrant was insufficient on its face and
dismissed the indictment. Subsequently, the federal agent swore to a com-
plaint in New Mexico and the petitioner was charged with violation of the
state narcotics law. Petitioner sought to enjoin the federal agent from
testifying in the state court with respect to the narcotics obtained by virtue
of the improper search warrant and to direct the agent to destroy the evi-
dence or to transfer it to another agent. The District Court for the District
of New Mexico denied the motion and on appeal the Circuit Court for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
holding that injunctive relief could be granted on the basis of the super-
visory power of the federal courts over federal law enforcement agencies.
Rea v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956).'
The Constitution. expressly protects the right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures ;2 however, the fourth amendment does not
preclude the use, in either federal or state courts, of evidence so obtained.
The danger resulting from such a construction was early noted by way of
dictum in the Supreme Court 3 and, twenty-eight years later, the Court,
17. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 349, comment e (1934).
1. Rea v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956) (5-4 decision).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (A similar provision is found in the constitution of
New Mexico, the state in which the incidents giving rise to this litigation occurred.
See N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 10).
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
[VOL. 1.
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in Weeks v. United States,4 adopted an exclusionary rule prohibiting the
use of such evidence in federal courts. However, in the case of Wolf v.
Colorado,5 it was said that the Constitution does not preclude the use of
illegally obtained evidence in state courts, nor are these courts bound by the
exclusionary rule, although some states have chosen to adopt it.6 In federal
courts, state officers are considered strangers in so far as the use of evi-
dence procured by an unreasonable search and seizure is concerned. Even
though the search is illegal, the evidence is admissible in federal courts,7
unless a federal officer participated in the search.8 Moreover, participation
by a federal agent in an illegal search does not prevent the use of the evi-
dence in state courts not adhering to the exclusionary rule.9 Congress has
authorized the issuance of search warrants and has prescribed the con-
ditions under which they may be used.10 It has been held that the fourth
amendment and legislation regulating search warrants should be liberally
construed in the individual's favor." Pursuant to the statute, an injured
party may move to suppress evidence obtained from such a search and
seizure, 12 providing such motion is timely,'3 and the district court, in the
exercise of its inherent power to discipline its officers, may grant relief.' 4
The lower federal courts have expressly held that retention of property
under a defective warrant violates constitutional rights,15 and the person
is prima facie entitled to restoration.' 6 Fact determination rests with the
judge IT whose findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.' 8
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6. Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ky., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.D., Tenn.,
Tex., Wash., W.Va., Wis., Wyo.
7. United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1953).
8. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) ; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1927) ; United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Thompson v.
United States, 22 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1927) ; In re Schuetze, 299 Fed. 827 (W.D.N.Y.
1924).
9. Terrano v. State, 59 Nev. 247, 91 P.2d 67 (1939).
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a),(c).
11. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) ; Grau v. United States, 287 U.S.
124 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
13. Dunn v. United States, 98 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Sam
Chin, 24 F. Supp. 14 (D. Md. 1938).
14. Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
866 (1952) ; In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930) ; cf. In re Meader, 60 F. Supp.
80 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (jurisdiction is based on property being in the custody of an offi-
cer of the court in which the proceeding was brought).
15. Freeman v. United States, 160 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Honeycutt v. United
States, 277 Fed. 939 (4th Cir. 1921).
16. Fabri v. United States, 24 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1928).
17. Simmons v. United States, 206 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Burris v. United
States, 192 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1951).
18. Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948).
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Federal legislation, which is controlling in the instant case, does not per-
mit the return of property seized under any revenue law of the United
States.19 Property seized by state officers will not be subject to a motion to
suppress, though the evidence is subsequently given to federal officers. 20
In addition, the Supreme Court has denied injunctive relief to a
criminal defendant seeking to prevent the fruit of an unlawful search by
state officers from being used in a state trial on the ground that the search
deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal
Constitution in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act.21 However,
federal criminal proceedings are subject to scrutiny under the rule of
McNabb v. United States.22
The court in the case under consideration has ruled on an interesting
and novel question. Heretofore the outcome of search and seizure cases was
dependent on the evidentiary rule adopted by the particular state. It is now
possible to prevent the use of evidence illegally seized by a federal agent in
a state court. Though not directly opposed, this case violates the spirit of
Wolf v. Colorado.23 It appears to be a recognition of the Holmes-Brandeis
view that law enforcement is a gentlemanly game, wherein the commission
of a foul invalidates all succeeding play. 24 However, there is an inherent
practical limitation on this doctrine, the fact the relief is accorded through
the injunctive process. A defendant, suddenly faced with the presence of
a federal agent on the stand with illegally obtained evidence will hardly
have sufficient time to obtain injunctive relief. Unquestionably, some re-
straint on the use of such evidence by federal law enforcement officers
outside of the federal system is needed. However, short of Congressional
action or the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado a more desirable solution
might be found in an executive prohibition on testimony by federal officers
based on illegally obtained evidence. Since it is the function of the execu-
tive branch of the Government to supervise law enforcement activities
as such,'25 this would appear to be a more desirable approach. While ac-
complishing the same result as the injunction it would avoid a direct clash
between the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts-at present a
highly sensitive area.
James A. Matthews, Jr.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2463 (1952), "All property taken or detained under any revenile
law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the cus-
tody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United
States having jurisdiction thereof."
20. Losieau v. United States, 177 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1949). This might be the
next area to which the principal of the Rea case will be applied.
21. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
22. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
23. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24. See 56 HARV. L. Rev. 1008 (1943).
25. Rea v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292, 295 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-FORNICATION AND BASTARDY
-DEGREE OF PROOF-GESTATION PERIOD.
Commonwealth v. Watts (Pa. 1955).
In a prosecution for fornication and bastardy, the prosecutrix testified
that her last intercourse with the defendant took place in September, 1953,
at least 310 days before the birth of the child. The prosecutrix also testified
that she had no relations with anyone else during September, October or
November of 1953. The only medical testimony introduced at the trial was
to the effect that the normal gestation period is 282 days, with two weeks
leeway in either direction. The court, in its charge to the jury, quoted from
a medical volume 1 that pregnancy has been found to vary from 220 days
to 330 days, the average being 270 days. The conviction of the defendant
was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Commonwealth v.
Watts, 116 A.2d 844 (Pa. 1955).2
The offenses of fornication and bastardy were not crimes at common
law, both being regarded as private wrongs (Ecclesiastical offenses), 3 but
were punishable under the early statutes of Pennsylvania. 4 Some states
consider the proceedings to be civil,5 and a conviction may be based on a
fair preponderance of the evidence. Other states consider the proceedings
to be quasi-criminal,6 requiring a much greater amount of evidence to sup-
port a conviction. Other states consider the proceedings to be criminal.7
The Pennsylvania statute 8 is in this last category, and the defendant must
be shown by positive evidence to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.9 In
addition, a verdict of not guilty cannot be set aside nor appealed in Penn-
sylvania. 10 In an early case, the defendant was convicted where the gesta-
tion period was established at 313 days.' However, in that case it was
stated that the evidence should be clear and free from doubt, and that the
1. DELEE-GRIZNHILL, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS (8th ed. 1943).
This volume was also quoted in Commonwealth v. Young, 163 Pa. Super. 279, 283, 60
A.2d 831, 833 (1948).
2. Commonwealth v. Watts, 116 A.2d 844 (Pa. 1955).
3. Commonwealth v. Walker, 2 Dist. 727 (C.P. Pa. 1893).
4. Cock v. Rambo, Penny. Col. Cas. 79 (1685), cited in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§ 4506, n.2 (Supp. 1955).
5. See, e.g. Copes v. Malcarne, 118 Conn. 304, 172 Atl. 89 (1934) ; People v. Dile,
347 I1. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931) ; State v. Reigel, 194 Minn. 308, 260 N.W. 293 (1935);
Calaway v. Town of Belleville, 116 N.J.L. 377, 184 Atd. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
6. See, e.g., Peak v. Calhoun, 63 App. D.C. 113, 69 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1934);
Commissioner of Public Welfare of City of New York v. Ryan, 238 App. Div. 607,
265 N.Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dep't 1933).
7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mekelburg, 235 Mass. 383, 126 N.E. 790 (1920).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4506 (Supp. 1955).
9. Commonwealth v. Rex, 147 Pa. Super. 121, 24 A.2d 98 (1942).
10. Commonwealth v. Kriekel, 121 Pa. Super. 423, 183 Atl. 749 (1936).
11. Commonwealth v. Hoover, 3 Clark 514 (Pa. 1846).
MAY 1956]
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prosecutrix should possess a character beyond reproach, and her testimony
should be consistent and uncontradicted in all material facts. In a later
case, the decision was left to the jury to believe either the prosecutrix or
the defendant and the precautions of the early case as to the prosecutrix's
testimony were not noted. 12 In the instant case the trial court did not feel
bound by the medical testimony concerning the gestation period, 1 but in its
charge to the jury preferred to take judical notice of a medical text1 4 used
in another case, stating:
"The Young case authorized the court to take judicial notice of
accepted medical opinions in respect to duration of pregnancy, and the
court below in this case used the same time span in its charge as that
approved in Commonwealth v. Young, supra." 15
It is not evident from the Young case that the court was so authorized,
the medical authority in question being one of several texts used by the
court in reaching its decision.
Judicial notice should not be taken of an arbitrarily selected medical
authority, without at least an opportunity for the defense to refute the
authority. This is especially true when the fact noticed is a material part of
the case needed to convict the defendant, and not merely a collateral issue.
Since both fornication and bastardy are criminal offenses in Pennsylvania,
the alleged relationship by the defendant must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. In the present case, the extreme rarity of such a long gestation
period of itself raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.' This
doubt can be overcome only by giving to the testimony of the prosecutrix
the highest degree of credibility. The court cannot infer that the jury in
this case looked with such favor on her testimony unless the jury was ex-
plicitly made aware of the highly improbable nature of such a protracted
period of gestation. 17 An accusation of paternity is relatively easy to make,
but often very difficult to refute. The Pennsylvania Superior Court seems
to be adding to that difficulty.
Thomas F. Burns
12. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 39 Berks 297 (Q.S. Pa. 1947).
13. Commonwealth v. Watts, 116 A.2d 844, 845 (Pa. 1955). But see Common-
wealth v. Jodlowsky, 163 Pa. Super. 284, 60 A.2d 836 (1948).
14. DLEE-GREENHILL, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE oV OBSTETRICS (8th ed. 1943).
15. Commonwealth v. Watts, 116 A.2d 844, 845 (Pa. 1955), referring to Com-
monwealth v. Young, 163 Pa. Super. 279, 60 A.2d 831, 833 (1948).
16. Judge Woodside, dissenting in the instant case, cites many authorities as sub-
stantiating the conclusion that the chance of a birth being caused by intercourse 312
days earlier is less than one in a million.
17. Transcript of Record, pp. 53a-62a, Commonwealth v. Watts, 116 A.2d 844(Pa. 1955).
[VOL. 1.
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CRIMINAL LAW-FELONY MURDER-HoMICIDE OF Co-FELON.
Commonwealth v. Thomas (Pa. 1955)
The defendant and Henry Jackson, the deceased, held up a grocery
store. Jackson was armed but there was no evidence that the defendant
was carrying a weapon. While fleeing the scene of the robbery with the
grocer in pursuit, the defendant ran in one direction and Jackson ran in
another. After an exchange of shots, the grocer killed Jackson and, after
his capture, the defendant was indicted for first degree murder under the
Pennsylvania felony-murder statute.' Defendant's demurrer to the com-
monwealth's evidence, sustained by the trial court, was reversed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court (4 to 3) which held that a co-felon may be
tried for first degree murder under the felony-murder statute where the
victim of the felony kills the other felon. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117
A.2d 204 (Pa. 1955).2
Under the felony-murder doctrine, a murder committed in the course
of certain felonies is murder as defined by the degree-of-murder statutes or
as defined by common law in the absence of such statutory definition.3
All of the states except three have enacted felony-murder statutes, 4 but
these statutes have been construed as merely determinative of the degree
and not determinative of the elements of the offense. 5 Thus, "murder" as
it appears in the felony-murder statutes is given its common-law meaning
unless the particular state has defined the term by statute. Since "murder"
has not been statutorily defined in Pennsylvania, except for a specific in-
stance not pertinent here,6 the Pennsylvania courts have relied on the com-
mon law in determining liability under the felony-murder statute.7 Murder
has been defined by the courts in Pennsylvania as the "unlawful killing of
another with malice aforethought, express or implied." 8 Where the killing
occurs during the commission of certain felonies, malice is implied and the
felony-murder doctrine applies. In order for the felon to be found guilty
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4701 (Supp. 1954).
2. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1955).
3. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §§ 200, 201 (1897); Hitchler, The Killer and
His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53 DICK. L. REv. 3 (1948) ; Moesel, Survey of
Felony-Murder, 28 TEMP. L. Q. 452 (1955).
4. Kentucky, Maine, and South Carolina do not have specific felony-murder stat-
utes.
5. Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A.2d (1950) ;' CLARK & MARSHALL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW o CRIMES 333 (5th ed. 1952).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4919 (Supp. 1954) provides that where the wanton
derailment of a railroad train results in a death, the perpetrator of the derailment is
guilty of murder in the first degree and punishable accordingly.
7. Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Elliot, 349 Pa. 488, 37 A.2d 582 (1944); Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19
A.2d 98 (1941).
8. Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 515, 516, 76 A.2d 394, 396 (1950).
MAY 1956]
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under this common-law felony-murder doctrine, the killing must be done
by the defendant or by one acting in furtherance of the felonious under-
taking.9 However, in Commonwealth v. Moyer,10 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court stated that it was immaterial whether the felon or the victim
of the robbery fired the fatal bullet which killed a police officer. This state-
ment was not necessary to the decision in that case since it had already
been proved that the bullet actually came from the felon's gun.' Never-
theless, the supreme court in Commonwealth v. Almeida 12 relied on the
tort concept of proximate cause and on this statement in the Moyer case in
finding a felon guilty of felony-murder during a robbery when an inter-
vening police officer was shot down by police bullets.
The Almeida case stands in a unique position in its application of
proximate cause to the felony-murder doctrine. Courts have solidly with-
stood the inroads of this tort principle due to the strict construction de-
manded by criminal statutes which may deprive the accused of life and
liberty. Perhaps this policy of strict construction was outweighed in the
Almeida case by the court's sense of responsibility for the protection of in-
nocent third parties. Thus, the desired result was obtained by using a por-
tion of the tort liability concept, namely, proximate cause, without consider-
ing another major facet of the tort doctrine, the supervening cause. In the
present case, there was no pressing need for the result arrived at except
the court's avowed declaration that
"For the protection and welfare of the people of this Commonwealth,
the public and the Courts must stop coddling criminals, young as well
as old, otherwise the terrible brutal crime wave which is sweeping our
State and Country will never be halted." 13
The court's purpose is laudatory, but should not be the basis for ex-
ceeding the judicial function of interpreting existing law, particularly
where such an extension renders a person subject to a penal statute by
implication. Not only has the court usurped a function of the legislature
in this case, but, by a perversion of the concepts of tort liability, has ven-
tured on the thin ice of substantive due process of law.
Joseph R. Glancey
9. Butler v. People, 125 Il. 691, 18 N.E. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Moore,
121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); State v. Oxendine, 182 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568
(1924).
10. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
11. Id. at 184-186, 53 A.2d 736, 738, 739 (1947).
12. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
13. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117 A.2d 204, 213 (Pa. 1955). (concurring opin-
[VOL. 1.
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EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-INADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS
-RECITAL OF CAUSE OF INJURY.
Williams v. Alexander (N.Y. 1955)
Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by an automobile driven by the de-
fendant as the plaintiff was crossing a street with the traffic light in his
favor. At the trial, the plaintiff contended that the defendant drove through
a red light and ran into him. The defendant claimed his car was at a com-
plete standstill and was propelled into the plaintiff when it was struck from
behind by another vehicle. The plaintiff offered in evidence that portion of
the hospital record pertaining to the extent of his injuries. The defendant,
thereupon, over the plaintiff's objection, introduced the balance of the rec-
ord, part of which contained a statement, allegedly made by the plaintiff,
describing the occurrence in the manner testified to by the defendant.
Plaintiff's objection that the statement was inadmissible hearsay was over-
ruled and a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant. The appellate
division affirmed, but the New York Court of Appeals by a 4-3 decision
held that the admission of the plaintiff's statement was reversible error
since it was not made in the regular course of the hospital's business and
hence was inadmissible under § 374-a of the Civil Practice Act.' Williams
v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955). 2
Records and reports prepared in the course of business, profession,
occupation, or avocation, if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein, are excludable under the hearsay rule unless admissible under some
exception created by practice or statute.8 In 1936, 4 and again in 1953, 5 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed
such statutes. The forerunner in this particular field, however, was New
York State, whose "business entry" statue6 was enacted in 1928. Many
jurisdictions have enacted similar legislation 7 and are unanimous in hold-
ing hospital records to be within their scope.8 These statutes afford a more
1. "Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event,
shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or event,
if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular course of any business, gnd
that it was the regular course 'of such business to make such memorandum or record
at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including
lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight
but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business shall include business,
profession, occupation and calling of every kind." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 374-a.
2. Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
3. 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1520 (3d ed. 1940) ; 4 UTAH L. REv. 327, 329 (1955).
4. UNIFORM BusINEss REcORDS As EVIDENcE ACT.
5. UNIFORM RULEs op EVIDE:NcE, Rule 63 (13).
6. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 37 4-a.
7. Variations of the New York statute or the Uniform Business Records as Evi-
dence Act have been adopted in twenty-eight states and in the federal courts.
8. Schaffer v. Seas Shipping Co., 218 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 973 (1955); Sadjak v. Parker-Wolverine Co., 281 Mich. 84, 274 N.W. 719
(1937); Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 62 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 1954) ; Melton v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W.2d 663 (1952) ; Roberto v. Nielson,
262 App. Div. 1035, 30 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 581 42 N.E.2d 27
k1942) ; Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A.2d 688 (1945).
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workable rule of evidence 9 and avoid the strict common-law rules concern-
ing business records, 10 further, they bring the rules of evidence nearer to
the standards of responsible action outside the courts 11 and avoid the ne-
cessity of calling countless entrants of business records as witnesses. 12
Many courts, however, refuse to construe these statutes liberally.1 3 Partic-
ularly troublesome is the phrase "course of business." The New York
Court of Appeals in the instant case took its initial stand on the matter 14
and followed the majority view that a strict interpretation is to be given
"course of business". Specifically, the court held that it was not the hos-
pital's business to inquire into the history of an injury unless such inquiry
would aid in treatment 15 or in understanding the medical aspects of the
case. 16 The dissent, on the other hand, would permit the statement in evi-
dence as an admission against interest or would give a liberal interpretation
to "course of business".' 7
The decision in this case is particularly striking in that it permits one
who offers in evidence parts of a hospital record to object to the introduc-
tion of other parts of the same record. The plaintiff, by initially offering
the record into evidence vouched for its accuracy, and yet later was per-
mitted to successfully object to that portion of the same record which con-
tained an admission against his interest. The majority opinion did not deal
with the adverse admission problem at all, 18 but placed its decision on a
narrow interpretation of the New York statute. Exceptions to the hearsay
rule (including admissions) are generally measured by the trustworthiness
9. Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
10. Melton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W.2d 663 (1952)
Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
11. Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50
A.2d 256 (1946).
12. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 62 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 1954) ; Weis v. Weis, 147
Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
13. Dougherty v. City of New York, 267 App. Div. 828, 45 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2d
Dep't 1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 786, 66 N.E.2d 299 (1946).
In jurisdictions other than New York, cases supporting the instant one include:
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ; Sadjak v. Parker-Wolverine Co., 281 Mich.
84, 274 N.W. 719 (1937) ; Green v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63 (1948) ;
Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A.2d 688 (1945). Business entry statutes
were given a more liberal interpretation, with respect to hospital records, in Schaffer
v. Seas Shipping Co., 218 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955) ;
Tucker v. Loew's Theatre, 149 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1945); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point
Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50 A.2d 256 (1946).
14. Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1955).
15. Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A.2d 689 (1948) ; Melton v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W.2d 663 (1952) ; Green v. Cleve-
land, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63 (1948).
16. Borucki v. Mackenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938) Weis v.
Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
17. Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417, 420, 421 (1955) (dis-
senting opinion).
18. The dissenting judges in the appellate division believed the statement in ques-
tion could not be admitted as an admission against interest since the transcribing physi-
cian was not called to testify. 285 App. Div. 819, 136 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (2d Dep't
1955). But see 6 WIGMORn, EvIEoNcE § 1707 (3d ed. 1940) "... they themselves (the
physicians and nurses) rely upon the record of their own actions; hence to call them
to the stand would ordinarily add little or nothing to the information furnished by the
memo alone."
11
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of the evidence offered. 19 The admissions exception is based on the adver-
sary theory that a party may not complain when his own assertions are
introduced in evidence without cross-examination. 20 Further, an admission
by a party when offered against him is substantive evidence of the matter
admitted, 21 and the party against whom a part of a document is introduced,
may, in turn, complement it by putting into evidence the remainder so that
the court will have a complete understanding of the entire document.22 It
is to be noted that the admissions exception to the hearsay rule is not lim-
ited to facts against the interest of the declarant at the time the admission
is made; it is not limited to those situations involving the absence of the
declarant; nor does the statement have to be made to the other party to the
cause.2 3 Under the circumstances present in this case the court could have
admitted the entire record by giving the statute a broader interpretation.
In any event the portion of the record objected to should have been ad-
mitted as an admission against interest.
Joseph F. Monaghan
FEDERAL COURTS-DIVERSITY JURISDICTION-VENUE OF
PLAINTIFF CORPORATIONS "DOING BUSINESS."
Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. Espenshade (E.D. Pa. 1956).
Plaintiff, an Indiana corporation leasing terminal facilities in Phila-
delphia, owned a tractor-trailer which collided with a vehicle owned by de-
fendant, Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, and operated by decedent
Penrose Espenshade, an employee of the Commission. Frances Espen-
shade, his widow, was appointed administratrix of his estate and named co-
defendant in this action. While both defendants would have been amenable
to suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania,' plaintiff, under its inter-
pretation of section 1391 (c) 2 of the Judicial Code, brought this action in the
eastern district to recover damages allegedly sustained to its tractor-trailer
as a result of the collision. Defendants moved to dismiss claiming: (1)
Lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a cause of action, and (3) im-
proper venue. After determining that the commission was not an agency of
the commonwealth but a separate legal entity, and that the decedent's act
was being performed for the benefit of the commission, the court held that
venue was proper as to both defendants on the alternate grounds that (a)
where defendants reside in different districts suit may be brought in either
19. 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
20. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. Rev. 181, 183 (1937).
21. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (3d ed. 1940) ; Morgan, Admissions as an Ex-
ception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921).
22. 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2102, 2113 (3d ed. 1940).
23. 4 WIGmORE, EViDENCE §§ 1049, 1057a (3d ed. 1940).
1. 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) (1952).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952).
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district 3 and (b) that Section 1391 (c) of the Judicial Code 4 allows a
plaintiff corporation to sue in a judicial district where it is doing business.
Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. Espenshade (E.D. Pa. 1956).5
Venue is the place where a court's jurisdiction may be exercised. It
relates to the convenience of the parties and, as such, is often subjct to their
disposition." Venue is a personal privilege in the defendant to compel suit
only in those forums provided for in the applicable venue statute.7 The
privilege may be asserted or waived at the defendant's election., Being a
privilege, it may be lost by failure to assert it seasonably, by formal sub-
mission in a cause, or by submission through conduct.9 "Whether such
surrender of a personal immunity be conceived negatively as a waiver or
positively as a consent to be sued, is merely an expression of literary pref-
erence." 10 Where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship
venue is limited by Section 1391 (a) of the Judicial Code 11 to the district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. 12 The residence of a corpora-
tion has traditionally been the state and district wherein it is incorporated.13
This strict notion of corporate residence has been followed in an unbroken
line of decisions. 14 "But the fact that corporations did do business ouside
their originating bounds made intolerable their immunity from suit in the
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1950). Though the court stated that this section was
controlling, it stated that in any event it had already found that the plaintiff corpora-
tion was "doing business" under section 1391(a). Thus the holding under section
1392(a) might very well be dictum. However, unless it is dictum the court is by im-
plication overruling Hawks v. Maryland & Pa. R.R., 90 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1950),
which clearly stated that section 1392 is to be invoked only in those intrastate situations
when the general venue statute would force the plaintiff to bring two or more suits.
4. See note 2, supra.
5. Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. Espenshade, 134 LEGAL INTELLIGENcER No. 20,
p.1, col. 3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1956), citing Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949).
6. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
7. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Mission
Beverage Co. v. Porter, 72 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
8. Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Commercial
Ins. v. Stone, 278 U.S. 177 (1929).
9. Commercial Ins. v. Stone, 278 U.S. 177 (1929).
10. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308
U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1952).
12. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
13. "It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the bcun-
daries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law,
and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obliga-
tory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation,
and cannot migrate to another sovereignty." Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S.
444 (1892), quoting Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
14. Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892) ; In re Keasbey and Mat-
tison Co., 160 U.S. 221 (1895) ; Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 215
U.S. 501 (1910) ; Laden v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357 (1910) ; Male v. Atch-
ison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 240 U.S. 97 (1916) ; General Investment Co. v. Lake
Shore and M.S. R.R., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) ; Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chiclzo,
R.I. & P. R.R., 270 U.S. 363 (1926) ; Luckett v. Delpark. Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926) ;
Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208 (1927) ; Suttle v. Reich Bros.
Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948).
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states of their activities." 15 The legislatures, therefore, required the cor-
porations to appoint agents for the service of process in exchange for the
privilege of doing local business. Such appointment of an agent was sub-
sequently construed as consent to be sued in the federal courts of the state
as well as in the state courts.' 6
But under this so-called Neirbo doctrine, a corporation doing business
within the state without having complied with the state law had not sur-
rendered its immunity to suit in that state. 7 This placed a premium on non-
compliance with the state law. Still another difficulty was pointed up by
the case of Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co.'5 in which a Texas corpora-
tion and a Louisiana partnership were sued jointly by a citizen of Missis-
sippi in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The court held that the Texas
corporation was not a "resident" of the eastern district even though it had
made itself amenable to suit in either district of Louisiana by complying
with the law of that state requiring nomination of an agent to receive serv-
ice of process. We are thus brought to the situation where a non-resident
plaintiff, suing a foreign corporation doing business in the state where the
cause of action arose, may be forced to sue in the state of his residence 19
or in the state of incorporation even though the logical and convenient place
to sue is the district where the witnesses and evidence are available. To
remedy this situation, it is submitted, Section 1391 (c) of the Judicial Code
was enacted. 20 "Doing business" now imposes upon a defendant corpora-
tion the status of "resident," whether or not it has complied with state law.
Considered thus, the section need not apply to plaintiff corporations; by
definition venue applies to defendants. Rather, Congress has seen fit to
accomplish legislatively what Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.21
began judicially. In other words, ". . . 1391 (c) has merely clarified by
legislation what the courts have been declaring by interpretation as to venue
for corporate defendants only, broadened to eliminate any necessity or re-
sort to waiver." 22 In construing section 1391(c) as giving a plaintiff cor-
15. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308
U.S. 165, 170 (1939).
16. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) ; EX parte
Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1878).
17. Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. 333 U.S. 163 (1948). The critical issue of the case was whether the Texas
corporation could be regarded as a "resident" of the eastern district within the mean-
ing of section 52 of the Judicial Code which stated that if there are two or more de-
fendants residing in different districts of the state, suit may be brought in either dis-
trict. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 113 (1940) later replaced by 62 STAT. 935
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1952).
19. Section 51 of the Judicial Code provided that in diversity of citizenship cases
... suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff
or the defendant." 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940) later replaced by 62
STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1952).
20. ". . . (A) corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is in-
corporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district
shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 28 U.S.C.§ 1391(c) (1952).
21. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
22. Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105 F. Supp. 530, 531 (N.D. Ohio
1952).
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poration the right to sue in a judicial district where it is doing business 23
the court in the instant case has departed from the traditional notion of
venue. And, in apparently departing from the congressional intent,24 it has
done violence to the settled principle that a defendant is entitled to be sued
in his own vicinage.
Joseph R. McDonald
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TE NANTS-RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP-
RIGHT OF MURDERER TO ENFORCE.
Bradley v. Fox (Ill. 1955).
Defendant, a joint tenant with the right of survivorship in certain real
estate, was convicted of the murder of his wife, his co-tenant. Action was
brought by the administrator and daughter of the deceased to impose a con-
structive trust on one-half of the property. The complaint was dismissed
by the lower court. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois the court
overruled the case of Welsh v. James 1 and held that the defendant's feloni-
ous act destroyed his right of survivorship. As a result, a constructive trust
was imposed on the estate so that the defendant held it as a tenant in com-
mon with the decedent's heirs at law. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 129
N.E.2d 699 (1955).2
While there are certain distinguishing features between a joint tenancy
and a tenancy by the entireties, their incidents as to survivorship appear to
be exactly the same.3 Therefore, it is unnecessary to distinguish between
the two in dealing with the problem presented in the instant decision. The
general rule concerning survivorship in these forms of concurrent estates
is that the survivor takes the whole estate upon the death of his co-tenant.4
However, a contrary result has been reached by many courts in those cases
in which the surviving tenant has murdered his co-tenant. Thus, some
courts have held that the entire estate vests in the heirs at law of the de-
23. There is a sharp split of authority in the district courts on this question. Conm-
pare Southern Paperboard Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ;
Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ; Freiday
v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), with Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport,
94 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Iowa 1950) ; United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1954).
24. In his appearance before the House Sub-Committee Number One, Professor
Moore testified as to venue as follows: "Venue provisions have not been altered by
the revision." 28 U.S.C.A., Legisl. History Supp., p. 405. Also, see MOORE, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE § 0.03 (28) pp. 193, 194 (1949); 1-a OHLINGER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 297 (rev. ed.).
1. 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950).
2. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
3. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 37,0 (1939); BURBY, REAL PROPERTY
§§200, 209 (1943).
4. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 282, 290 (Abridged ed. 1940).
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ceased since equity will not allow a person to profit from his own wrong.5
Practically speaking, the same result is reached in those cases which impose
a constructive trust on the entire estate held by the murderer for the benefit
of the heirs of the deceased. 6 This doctrine has been modified by permit-
ting the surviving co-tenant to enjoy the use of the property during his
lifetime, holding the remainder as a constructive trustee for the bene-
fit of his victim's heirs.7 On the other hand, many jurisdictions allow
the whole estate to pass to the survivor, notwithstanding his felonious act,
on the theory that he was possessed of the complete estate from the time of
the original grant.8 Most courts, however, prefer a middle ground. There-
fore, it has been held that the survivor of the concurrent estate becomes a
tenant in common with the heirs of the deceased, 9 or, a constructive trustee
of one-half of the estate for the benefit of such heirs.' 0 A somewhat novel
solution was reached in Sherman v. Weber." In that case the court rea-
soned that while the husband had the fee as survivor, the heirs of the mur-
dered wife should receive the income from one-half of the estate for the
length of the wife's life expectancy which was shorter than that of her
husband. Conversely, some jurisdictions merely permit the malefactor to
receive one-half of the net income of the property for life, the complete
estate going to the heirs of the victim upon the murderer's death.12 Sub-
stantially the same result is reached in Pennsylvania by virtue of the Slay-
er's Act.' 3
The difficulty lies in the conflict between the equitable maxim refusing
to permit a person to profit from his own wrong and those provisions of
the various state constitutions which forbid forfeiture of estate for a crim-
inal act.' 4 Those courts which permit the felon to take the entire interest
in the estate rely on the fiction that the whole estate is vested in the co-
tenant at the time of the grant and therefore the survivor takes nothing
new. On the other hand those jurisdictions which completely divest the
survivor of his interest disregard the fiction and rely solely on equitable
principles. Neither of these positions is as persuasive as those cases which
5. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't 1935)
Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918); In re
King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952). Some significance might be at-
tached to the fact that in these cases the slayer took his own life immediately after
the murder of his spouse.
6. Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952).
7. Diamond v. Ganci, 328 Mass. 315, 103 N.E.2d 716 (1952).
8. Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950) ; Oleff v. Hodapp, 129
Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935) ; Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971(1939) ; Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
9. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951) ; Buduit v. Herr, 339 Mich.
265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954) ; Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948).
10. Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
11. 113 N.J. Eq. 431, 167 At. 517 (Ch. 1933).
12. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ch. 1951) ; Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3445, 3446 (Supp. 1954).
14. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, §11; Mo. CONST. art. 1, §30; see also N.Y. PEN. LAW§ 512.
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strike a middle ground by creating a tenancy in common. Under such hold-
ings the survivor is permitted to retain an interest in the property which
closely approximates that which he had before his felonious act and yet
prevents him from profiting by his own misdeed. This is the conclusion
reached by the Illinois court and it is the most desirable.
John C. Voss
SALES-WARRANTIES-EFFECT OF DISCLAIMER ON
IMPLIED WARRANTIEs-GoODS CHANGED IN KIND.
Gagnon v. Speback (Pa. 1955)
The defendants entered into a contract with the plaintiff for the pur-
chase of potatoes, one-half of the purchase price being paid in cash. A
judgment note was executed for the balance. During the course of the
negotiations, the parties went to the place of storage where the defendants
were given the opportunity to examine the potatoes which were stored in a
bin twelve feet deep. The plaintiff's offer was to grade and bag the potatoes
or to sell them "in place" at a lower price. The defendants accepted the
latter proposal. The bill of sale provided in part that the sale was made
with "the express understanding that there is no warranty of quality or
quantity whatsoever." On taking possession of the goods, the defendants
discovered that seventy-five per cent of the potatoes were rotten. Judg-
ment was entered by confession on the note, and the defendants brought a
rule to show cause why the judgment should not be opened. The Court of
Common Pleas, Indiana County, discharged the rule. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the order was affirmed on the grounds
that no representation of merchantability had been made; and had one been
made at all, its omission from the written contract was not shown to have
been by fraud, accident, or mistake. Gagnon v. Speback, 118 A.2d 744
(Pa. 1955). 1
The Uniform Sales Act provides that "any affirmation of fact or any
promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the
natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods relying thereon." 2 This is true even though one exam-
1. Gagnon v. Speback, 118 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1955). There were subsidiary issues
involved in this case which will not be discussed, namely, the parol evidence rule and
the authority of a partner to execute notes on behalf of the partnership. The Uniform
Commercial Code, which is now in effect in Pennsylvania, was not applicable since
the present transaction took place before the enactment of the Code.
2. UNIFORM SALES ACT §12. See e.g. Mannsz v. Macwhyte, 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir.
1946) ; Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951) ; Chamberlain Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 51 Cal. App. 2d 520, 125 P.2d 113 (1942) ; Teter v. Shultz, 110
Ind. App. 541, 39 N.E.2d 802 (1942); Valente v. Mascitti, 163 Misc. 287, 295 N.Y.
Supp. 330 (City Court of Rochester, 1937) ; Ellen v. Heacock, 247 App. Div. 476, 286
N.Y. Supp. 740 (4th Dep't 1936) ; Brown v. Standard Hide Co., 301 Pa. 543, 152 Atl.
557 (1930) ; Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co., 242 Wis. 466, 8 N.W.2d 294
(1943). Defendant, in the instant case, attempted to show an express warranty but the
lower court excluded the evidence because of the parol evidence rule. On appeal, this
was one of the grounds used in affirming.
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ines the goods himself, yet indicating reasonable reliance on the seller's
judgment. 3 A seller of goods may, by disclaimer, refuse to warrant goods.4
However, such a clause does not absolve the seller from his obligation to
furnish goods of the character contracted f or.5 Implied warranties arise by
operation of law under the circumstances of each particular case6 and are
taken to be a part of the contract based on the presumed intention of the
parties. 7 As in express warranties, a disclaimer may also negate any im-
plied warranties in the agreement s although a few cases have held the
contrary.9 It is well settled that where an article is sold by a descriptive
name and the buyer relies thereon, a warranty arises that the goods will
conform to the description.'0 The Sales Act provides that where goods are
bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description,
there is an implied warranty that the goods are of merchantable quality."
This rule has been applied in instances where the article is sold by a generic
term, 12 and one court has held that there is an implied contract that potatoes
which one agrees to sell are merchantable and not frozen.' 3 It should be
noted, however, that where the buyer inspects, or has an opportunity to
inspect, the warranty of merchantability does not arise 14 unless the defect
3. Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178, 33 N.E. 493 (1893).
4. E.g. Burntisland Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Products Corp., 278 Fed. 552
(D. Del. 1922) ; Lomori v. Globe Laboratories, 35 Cal. App. 2d 248, 95 P.2d 173(1939) ; Sayeg v. Gloria Light Co., 233 App. Div. 761, 259 N.Y. Supp. 492 (2d Dep't
1932) ; Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co., 147 Wis. 166, 132 N.W. 902 (1911).
5. Stroack v. Lichententhal, 224 App. Div. 19, 229 N.Y. Supp. 371 (1st Dep't 1928) ;
Swift v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926) ; Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co.,
51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924).
6. E.g. Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1941)
Hobart Mfg. Co., v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 Atl. 580 (1937) ; Tews v.
Marg, 246 Wis. 245, 16 N.W.2d 795 (1944).
7. American Seedless Raisin Co. v. Joshua Hendy Iron Works, 94 Cal. App. 289,
271 Pac. 129 (1928) ; Hoyt v. Hainsworth Motor Co., 112 Wash. 440, 192 Pac. 918
(1920).
8. Alex J. Mandl Inc. v. San Roman, 170 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Worthington
Pump & Machinery Corp. v. Briarcliff, 67 Ga. App. 71, 19 S.E.2d 574 (1942) ; Garo-
falo v. St. Mary's Packing Co., 339 Ill. App. 412, 90 N.E.2d 292 (1950); Tharp v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 42 N.M. 443, 81 P.2d 703 (1938) ; Linn v. Radio City Deli-
catessen, 169 Misc. 879 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1939).
9. Little v. Van Syckle & Co., 115 Mich. 480, 73 N.W. 554 (1898) (no agree-
ment or undertaking other than stated) ; National Equipment Corp. v. Moore, 189
Minn. 632, 250 N.W. 677 (1933) (contract recited that it covered all agreements)
Hobart v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 Atd. 580 (1937).
10. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 14; Hanson v. Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319, 91 N.E. 383
(1910) ; Dinovo Fruit Co. v. McClintich, 214 Mich. 620, 183 N.W. 87 (1921) ; Lum-
brazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931) ; Brown v. Standard Hide Co.,
301 Pa. 543, 152 Atl. 557 (1930). It should be noted that under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, such warranties are considered express, thus preventing the operation of the
disclaimer clause. See UNIFORM COaMaCIAL CODE §§ 2-313, 2-316.
11. UNIFORM SALEs ACT 15(2).
12. Inter-State Grocer Co. v. George William Bentley Co., 214 Mass. 227, 101
N.E. 147 (1913) ; Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 196 Mass. 440, 82 N.E. 682 (1907).
13. Keown & McEvoy v. Verlin, 253 Mass. 374, 149 N.E. 115 (1925). (No dis-
claimer in this case; however, the right of inspection was at the risk of the seller.)
14. UNIFORM SALtS ACT § 14 Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1871);
Gillette v. Kelling Nut Co., 185 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Grass v. Steinberg, 331 Ill.
App. 378, 73 N.E.2d 331 (1947) ; McKeage Machinery Co. v. Osborne & Sexton Ma-
chinery Co., 124 Pa. Super. 387, 188 Atl. 543 (1936).
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could not have been discovered.' 5 The fact that an examination would be
inconvenient does not avoid the rule; to avoid the rule inspection must be
wholly impracticable.' 6 In the case of express warranties it is no defense
to the seller that the buyer, had he inspected, would have discovered the
falsity of the seller's statements.' 7 In the instant case, because of the meth-
od of storage, a question of practicability might be raised and an argument
of sale by sample made. The Sales Act in recognizing such sales raises an
implied warranty that the bulk shall correspond to the sample in quality.' 8
Nevertheless, in a sale where the term "as is" or similar language is used,
it is the general rule that there are no warranties, express or implied. 9
However, such a provision does not affect the seller's obligation to deliver
goods which comply with the description. 20
Probably no other decision could have been reached by the Court in
this case because of the specific written disclaimer; but the case is a good
example of a common problem which seldom reaches the appellate level.
The fact that the "as is" sale is a necessity of business can not be ques-
tioned. A seller must be able to rid himself of goods which no longer serve
their primary purpose. Therefore, it is important that there be a sale in
which all types of warranties are excluded. Moreover, the parties have
freedom of contract enabling them to enter such an agreement affected only
by the court's discretion in refusing specific performance of an unconscion-
able bargain. 21 The crux of the problem in such sales is brought to light
by Justice Musmanno, dissenting in the instant case. Although such sales
are justifiable, we must not lose sight of the fact that the seller is obligated
to deliver the same kind of goods as those contracted for. Specifically then,
the question is: Could the inferior goods found in the lower level of the
storage bin still be fairly considered potatoes? The difficulty lies in deter-
mining what constitutes a change in kind. Perhaps this was best expressed
by Justice Frank who once observed, "that a wag once inquired whether
the difference between a difference of kind and a difference of degree is
itself a difference of kind or a difference of degree. The answer is that it
is a difference of degree. A difference of kind is merely a violent difference
of degree." 22
James A. Matthews, Jr.
15. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 15(3) ; C.I.T. Corporation v. Shogren, 176 Okla. ,388,
55 P.2d 956 (1936) ; Libke v. Craig 35 Wash. 2d 870, 216 P.2d 189 (1950)
16. Pacific Commercial Co. v. 6 rier, 129 Cal. App. 751, 19 P.2d 543 (1933).
17. Flatbush Corp. v. Hatoff, 126 Misc. 573, 214 N.Y. Supp. 138 (Sup. Ct., App.T.
1926); Jones v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 246 Wis. 462, 17 N.W.2d 562 (1945).
18. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 16(1) ; Readex Microprint Corp. v. General Aniline &
Film Corp., 191 Misc. 414, 74 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
19. Detroit Trust Co. v. Engel, 192 Mich. 62, 158 N.W. 123 (1916) ; Johnson v.
Waisman Bros., 93 N.H. 133, 36 A.2d 634 (1944); Brooks v. Storr, 111 N.J. Law
316, 168 Atl. 382 (1933).
20. Schwartz v. Kohn, 155 N.Y. Supp. 547 (Sup. Ct. App.T. 1915) ; Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
21. The Commercial Code expressly makes unenforceable unconscionable clauses
in contracts. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-302.
22. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946) (concurring opin-
ion citing WILLIAMS, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. (1945) ).
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TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-SLANDER PER SE
-CALLING A PERSON A "COMMUNIST."
Solosko v. Paxton (Pa. 1956).
Plaintiff brought an action of trespass for slander against the defend-
ant who, he alleges, stated on three separate occasions, and in the presence
of others, that the plaintiff, a doctor, was a "Communist." Neither special
damages nor harm to the plaintiff's professional reputation were alleged.
Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and fixed
the amount of damage at $10,000; the trial court reduced the damages to
$3500. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in affirming the opinion of the
lower court held that the accusation in question constituted slander per se.
Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956). 1
Historically there are two forms of action for a defamatory publica-
tion-libel, where the words are written,2 and slander, where the words are
spoken.3 The law has always made a distinction between the two actions
when considering the essential allegations for maintaining the separate
action.4 In order to properly allege a cause of action for slander, it is nec-
essary in most instances to allege and prove special damages.5 This is not
an essential element of a cause of action for libel. There are a few well-
defined exceptions to the slander rule. When the words spoken tend to
injure the trade, occupation, business or profession of another, if they
charge him with having a loathsome disease, or if they charge him with
having committed a punishable crime involving moral turpitude, an action
for slander may be maintained without allegation or proof of special dam-
ages.6 In the instant case the defendant accused the plaintiff of being a
"Comunist".7 There are many holdings that such an allegation, if pub-
lished, constitutes libel per se.8 In reaching this conclusion some courts take
judicial notice of the current climate of opinion, 9 while others base their
decision on statutes making party membership a crime.' ° However, in the
present case slander, and not libel, is under consideration. There are deci-
sions stating that to call another a "Communist" is not slander per se. 1'
However, present in the instant case is a statute making membership in
1. Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956).
2. Sarkees v. Warner-West Corporation, 349 Pa. 365, 367, 37 A.2d 544, 546
(1944).
3. Buzzard v. Guest, 7 Montg. 197, 198 (C.P., Pa. 1891).
4. Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
5. Bennett v. Seimiller, 175 Kan. 764, 267 P.2d 926 (1954).
6. Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg. Co., 206 Misc. 801, 803, 135 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711
(Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Krunholz v. Raffer, 195 Misc. 788, 789, 91 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (Sup.
Ct. 1949).
7. Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956).
8. E.g., Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947).
9. Meneher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E. 257 (1947). See 42 COLUM. L. REv.
1282, 1304 (1942).
10. Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
11. Peeyk v. Semoncheck, 105 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 1952).
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the Communist Party a felony. 1 2 Such a statute defines a crime involving
moral turpitude.' 3 Whether or not the language used actually connoted that
the plaintiff was a member of the Communist Party is arguable. However,
by ruling that the term "Communist" implies the term "Communist Party
Member" the court has not gone far afield from the usual Pennsylvania
construction. 14 Hence, the Pennsylvania statute 15 being applicable, the
words are actionable as slander per se.' 6
This is the first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has spoken on
the question of whether or not the oral charge of "Communist" is slander
per se,17 but presuming the statute in question' 8 constitutional, the deci-
sion is unquestionably correct. The defendant might have raised the issue
of the constitutionality of the statute '" since the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania had recently declared a similar statute 20 unconstitutional due to
occupancy of the field by the federal government.2' However, the
interesting question of finding slander per se on the basis of a statute which
is subsequently declared unconstitutional was not presented. If it had been
presented, the court would have had to decide whether the inherent invalid-
ity of an unconstitutional statute rendering it technically void ab initio is to
be extended to collateral matters such as the basis for a finding of slander
per se. It would appear that the policy behind the exemption would be as
strong even in the face of the subsequent declaration of invalidity. The
injury to the reputation is no less because the statute creating the felony is
subsequently declared unconstitutional. On the other hand, the plaintiff
might have sustained his argument on other grounds. In addition to the
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3811 (Supp. 1954).
13. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTs 589, 590 (2d Ed. 1955) ("major social dis-
grace").
14. "The words must be given by judicial juries the same signification that other
people are likely to attribute to them. It is for the court to determine whether a pub-
lication is fairly and reasonably capable of the meaning imputed to it by the innuefldo
leaving it to the jury to say whether it actually conveys the meaning ascribed to it."
Boyer v. Pittsburgh Publishing Co., 324 Pa. 154, 157 (1936).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3811 (Supp. 1954).
16. Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956).
17. In McAndrew v. Scranton Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780 (1950),
it was stated that to say a man is a "Communist" is not to defame him. However, this
was dicta and the case was based on a publication. In ADA v. Meade, 72 Pa. D. & C.
306 (C.P., Phila. 1950), it was said that special damages did not have to be alleged in
an action against one who said that the organization was communist infiltrated. How-
ever in the case the defendant admitted that to say a man is a communist or a com-
munist sympathizer is to defame him, and furthermore, the action once again was based
on a writing (libel). In Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) the
court said that judicial notice had been taken of the fact that communism is a political
movement which is dedicated to the overthrow of the government of the United States
and incidentally of each state by force and violence, and, therefore, libel was commit-
ted by statements that the plaintiff engaged in communist activities, was a member cf
a communist organization, and hence was unfit to hold his public office and dangerous
to public security, are libelous per se. Notice that once again the issue was based on
published statements.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3811 (Supp. 1954).
19. Ibid.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4207 (Supp. 1954).
21. Nelson v. Pennsylvania, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1955), aff'd, 76 Sup. Ct.
477 (1956).
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Pennsylvania statute the plaintiff could have introduced all the federal
legislation on the subject.22 In so doing the court would be faced with the
question of whether the federal statutes would be grounds for calling into
operation the doctrine of slander per se in a state court. In this case of first
impression, it is regrettable that these other significant questions were not
confronted.
Regina M. Ward
TORTS-PARENT and CHILD-RIGHT OF CHILD TO SUE
PARENT FOR WILFUL MISCONDUCT.
Emery v. Emery (Cal. 1955).
Plaintiffs, unemancipated minors, were injured while riding in an
automobile owned by their father and operated by their minor brother, both
of whom were joined as defendants. The complaint alleged that their in-
juries were sustained through the wilful misconduct of the defendants. A
general demurrer to the complaint was filed by the defendants, and was
sustained. On appeal to the Supreme Court of California it was held that
the father's immunity from suit by his unemancipated children does not
extend to those cases in which wilful misconduct is alleged.' Emery v.
Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).2
Although the courts have never questioned a parent's liability for
criminal acts committed against the unemancipated child,8 there was little
or no litigation on the question of a parent's immunity in a tort action until
the leading case of Hewellette v. George 4 in 1891. In that case the court,
while citing no authority, held that there is an absolute, mutual immunity in
tort actions involving parent and child. Notwithstanding this lack of his-
torical precedent, the rule was quickly adopted in other jurisdictions.5 As a
further extension of the principle it was held that an emancipated child
cannot successfully bring suit for a tort committed before such emancipa-
tion.6 However, the fact of minority is not conclusive as to unemancipation
22. Communist Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 843 (Supp. 1955); Internal Security
Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 781 (Supp. 1955); Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §2385 (Supp. 1955).
1. The court also held that there was no immunity of an unemancipated brother
from a suit by an unemancipated sister.
2. Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).
3. E.g., Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E. 777 (1891) ; Powell v. State, 67
Miss. 119, 6 So. 646 (1889); Richardson v. State Board of Control, 98 N.J.L. 690,
121 AtI. 457 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, 99 N.J.L. 516, 123 Atl. 720 (1924).
4. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
5. E.g., Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
Pac. 788 (1905).
6. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924) ; Reingold v. Reingold,
115 N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935).
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and therefore such determination is left to the jury.7 It has been stated that
the rationale for the rule laid down in the Hewellette case is the preserva-
tion of domestic harmony.8 Some. courts have therefore modified the prin-
ciple by holding that the immunity is inoperative when the reason for the
rule fails.9 Thus, some jurisdictions will allow recovery by the child if the
tort was committed while the parent was engaged in a business activity,10
or if the parent abandons his parental duty." Further, it has been held,
under some wrongful death statutes, that a child has a right of action
against one parent whose negligence caused the death of the other parent. 12
Analogously, the recent case of Davis v. Smith 13 held that there was no
immunity in an action for negligence by an unemancipated minor against
the estate of his deceased father. However, a contrary result has been
reached by the majority of jurisdictions. 14 While most courts hold that the
fact that one of the parties was insured will not change the result because
of the danger of fraud, 15 some jurisdictions reach an opposite conclusion if
there is, in addition to the fact of insurance, an additional relationship be-
tween the parent and child such as master and servant.' 6 Finally the courts
have added one more exception to the general rule by holding that a child
can bring suit for an intentional tort 17 or wilful misconduct '8 by his
parent.
While the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the rule of absolute im-
munity, many courts have recognized the propriety of liberalizing the prin-
ciple by allowing the many exceptions to it. The statement that the rule
7. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908) ; Martena v. Martena,
11 N.J. Misc. 705, 167 At!. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
8. Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 Pac. 7 (1931) ; Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938).
9. Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) ; See McCurdy, Torts Be-
tween Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rev. 1030, 1056-1082 (1930).
10. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952), modified on rehear-
ing, 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251
P.2d 149 (1952). Contra, Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938);
Epstein v. Epstein, 124 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1953) held no immunity if no parental
relationship. This was reversed, however, in 283 App. Div. 855, 129 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st
Dep't 1954), which decision was affirmed by 308 N.Y. 935, 127 N.E.2d 87 (1955).
11. Manke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
12. Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940) ; Minkin v. Minkin,
336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939), 44 DIcK. L. REv. 143.
13. 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), 00 ViLL. L. Rzv. 99 (Preliminary ed. 1955).
14. Lasecki v. Karbara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940) ; accord, Harralson v.
Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
15. E.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Shaker v. Shaker,
129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942) ; Silverstein v. Kostner, 342 Pa. 207, 20 A.2d 205
(1941) ; Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
16. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932),
13 B.U.L. Rxv. 357 (1933).
17. See Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Manke v. Moore,
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
18. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) ; Siembob v. Siem-
bob, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 284
App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (4th Dep't 1954) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282,
218 P.2d 445 (1950).
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should not be observed when the reason for it fails is indicative of the ra-
tionale of the courts in creating such exceptions. The court in the instant
case utilized such reasoning in reaching its decision. It recognized that the
wilful misconduct of a parent, which results in injury to the unemancipated
child, has so disrupted the tranquility of the family circle that the conse-
quent litigation would not aggravate the already existing breach of domes-
tic harmony. Although this opinion represents the minority view it is in-
creasingly apparent that the courts are dissatisfied with a rule of absolute
immunity. It will not be surprising to find future litigation producing fur-
ther exceptions to the rule and to find some legislatures deeming it advis-
able to completely abolish the principle. 19
John C. Voss
TRUSTS-PENNSYLVANIA ESTATES ACT OF 1947-
ELECTION OF SURVIVING SPOUSE TO TAKE
AGAINST THE TRUST.
In re Brown's Estate (Pa. 1956)
The testator set up an unfunded insurance trust, and reserved to him-
self the right to revoke, change the beneficiaries, receive the income during
his lifetime, and withdraw any or all of the policies from the operation of
the agreement. The widow elected to take against this trust, contending
that the trustee was merely an agent and thus the trust was testamentary.
She also contended that the right of election was conferred upon her by the
Estates Act of 1947.1 On the basis of the opinion of the lower court judg-
ment for the widow was affirmed on appeal in a per curiam decision. In re
Brown's Estate, 119 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1956).2
In the past, it was comparatively simple in Pennsylvania for the dece-
dent to defeat the spouse's right to share in the decedent's assets.3 Where
the trust instrument vested a present interest in the beneficiaries, it was a
valid inter vivos trust, and was not rendered testamentary because the set-
tlor.reserved a beneficial life interest and a power to revoke or modify in
whole or in part.4 However, the courts were sympathetic to the plight of
the surviving spouse, and generally sought a way in which to label the trust
19. PROSSR, TORTS 675, 677 (2d ed. 1955).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1954) : "A conveyance of assets by a
person who retains a power of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or con-
sumption over the principal thereof, shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be
treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse is concerned to the
extent to which the power has been reserved .......
2. In re Brown's Estate, 119 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1956).
3. Comment, 5 U. PITT. L. Rvv. 78, 87 (1939).
4. Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946) ; Reese's Estate, 317 Pa. 473,
177 At. 792 (1935) ; Fidelity Trust Company v. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh,
313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (1933) ; Bierne v. Continental-Equitable Title and Trust Co.,
307 Pa. 570, 161 At. 721 (1932) ; Windolph v. Girard Trust Company, 245 Pa. 349,
91 At. 634 (1914) ; RtSTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57 (1) (1935); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 57.1
(Supp. 1954).
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as testamentary, thereby giving the survivor the right of election. Where
the settlor, in addition to the reservations above mentioned, reserved the
power to control the trustee as to the details of administration of the trust,
the trustee was held to be the agent of the settlor and the trust testamentary
as to dispositions intended to take effect after death. 5 However, the diffi-
culty was in the interpretation of "control of the trustee." 6 In New York,
the control of the trustee was treated as making the trust illusory insofar as
it concerned the surviving spouse, 7 but valid as to all other parties.8 The
settlor's motive in creating the trust is not important,9 and fraudulent in-
tent relates only to the question of the failure of the donor to divest himself
of ownership. 10 Such fraud would exist if the transfer were colorable, with
the donor retaining a concealed interest in the property." The Estates Act
of 1947 is not retrospective in application, 12 but does reflect the public
policy of the commonwealth,'13 and the courts resolve any doubt as to the
effectiveness of the trust in favor of the surviving spouse. 14 The scope of
the act is extremely broad, and while the instant case held that the unfund-
ed insurance trust was testamentary in character,' it also held that it was
within the scope of the statute.' 6 This wide scope is due to the broad def-
inition of "conveyance" given in this act.17
5. Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946) ; Hurley's Estate, 16 Pa. D.
& C. 521 (O.C., Phila. 1931); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57 (2) (1935).
6. Bullock Estate, 79 Pa. D. & C. 389 (O.C., Dauph. 1951). The court held that
where the settlor has the power to deal with the property as she likes, it is the power
to control and results in a testamentary trust. But see Sheasley Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77
A.2d 448 (1950), where it was held that the right to manage, lease, sell or otherwise
dispose of the property was merely the right to revoke and not such control as to make
the trust testamentary. However, in this case some weight was given to the formality
of the transfer. See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57, comment g (1935).
7. Krause, v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27 N.E.2d 779 (1941) ; Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y.
371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
8. President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 320, 14 N.Y.S.
2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
9. Rynier Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943) ; Black Estate, 73 Pa. D. & C.
86 (O.C., Del. 1950).
10. Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 269 Pa. 257, 112 Atl. 62 (1920) ; Win-
dolph v. Girard Trust Company, 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atd. 634 (1914) ; Black Estate, 73 Pa.
D. & C. 86 (O.C., Del. 1950).
11. De Noble v. De Noble, 331 Pa. 273, 200 Ati. 77 (1938).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §301.21 (Supp. 1954): "This act shall take effect on
the first day of January, one thousand nine hundred forty-eight and except as set forth
in section 3 hereof, shall apply only to conveyances effective on or after that day. As
to conveyances effective before that day the existing laws shall remain in full force
and effect." See also McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951).
13. In re Pengelly's Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953).
14. In re Pengelly's Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953) ; Vederman Estate,
78 Pa. D. & C. 207 (O.C., Phila. 1951). But see McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d
844 (1953), where it was held that it is not within the power of the legislature to take
the property of one person and give it to another.
15. But see Fidelity Trust Company v. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, 313
Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (1933). (Unfunded life insurance trust with proceeds to be paid
to trustee for benefit of wife and children, but reserving complete control in donor
during his life, held non-testamentary).
16. See Longacre v. Hornblower & Weeks, 83 Pa. D. & C. 259 (C.P., Phila. 1952)
(Shares of stock held in trust as joint tenants) ; Black Estate, 73 Pa. D. & C. 86
(O.C., Del. 1950) (Tentative trust).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.1 (Supp. 1954: ... "(2) 'Conveyance' means an
act by which it is intended to create an interest in real or personal property whether
the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation."
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The common law countries, as distinguished from those of the civil
law, where a system of forced heirship prevails, have wrestled continuously
with the problem of protection of the wife's interest in the husband's prop-
erty. The problem exists because in the division of labor which the family
implies, the husband is the nominal breadwinner, but the wife who normally
contributes to the economic success of the family enterprise is largely ex-
cluded from participation in the rewards. When the wealth of the com-
munity consisted principally of land the widow was protected by dower;
and there was no need for a similar interest in the personal property. When
more and more of the wealth of the community came to be invested in
personal property, the problem became acute. The right to take against the
will was devised for this purpose and the right to take against death-bed
gifts to charity is in pari materia. However, the law has developed that the
husband could too easily defeat both statutes by an inter vivos gift, even
one "where he retained almost as much as he gave away." If the family is
to be preserved as a favored institution, legislation of this sort seems neces-
sary, and the supreme court, in extending the rule beyond the letter of the
law into cases within its spirit, has in our opinion served the interest of
society. The subsequent amendment 18 of the statute after this decision
seems regressive in that it may 19 open up to the husband a convenient way
to evade his wife's interest by purchasing life insurance.
Thomas F. Burns
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S
LIABILITY AcT-DENIAL OF RECOVERY BY FILE CLERK.
Reed v. Pennsylvania R. R.
(3d Cir. 1955).
The plaintiff employee was custodian of the files from which blue-
prints were made for the defendant employer. These blueprints were trac-
ings of parts of locomotives, freight cars and other equipment used in the
railroad business. When an order came from some point on the railroad's
system asking for a blueprint, plaintiff would find the tracing and have
18. PA. S. 691, Sess. of 1955 in its pertinent section reads: "Section 4. Sections 11
and 21 of the act are amended to read Section 11 [Powers of Appointment Rights of
Surviving Spouse]
Conveyances to Defeat Marital Rights(a) In general A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of ap-
pointment by will or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal thereof
shall at the election of his surviving spouse be treated as a testamentary disposition
so far as the surviving spouse is concerned to the extent to which the power has been
reserved but the right of the surviving spouse shall be subject to the rights of any
income beneficiary whose interest in income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to the
death of the conveyor. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any contract
of life insurance purchased by a decedent whether payable in trust or otherwise." See
legislation section this issue, supra.
19. The other ground for the decision in the Brown case, namely, that the un-
funded insurance trust was testamentary, might still be available in spite of the statute.
MAY 1956]
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol1/iss2/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
blueprints made. The plaintiff was injured when a window in the defend-
ant's office building blew in during a storm. The Circuit Court affirmed
the district court ruling and held that the plaintiff was not covered by the
Federal Employers Liability Act since she was neither engaged in the
furtherance of commerce nor did her work directly or closely and substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. Reed v. Pennsylvania R. R., 227 F.2d
810 (3d Cid. 1955). 1
The FELA was designed to encompass only the area of railroad com-
mon carriers,2 but the Act does not cover all railroad employees. How-
ever, it is established that the employee of the carrier need not be a "rail-
roader" to be within the purview of the act.4  The determining test under
the FELA of 1908 was enunciated in the case of Shanks v. Dela-
ware, L. & W. R. R. as ". . . Was the employee, at the time of the
injury, engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely re-
lated to it to be practically a part of it?" 5 The emphasis here was
whether the employee at the time of the injury was actually working
in interstate transportation. In 1939 the act was amended, 6 and the in-
quiry was then whether any part of the duties of the employee was in the
furtherance of interstate commerce or whether they in any way directly
or closely and substantially affected such commerce.T Generally, courts in
interpreting this amendment have given it a broad and liberal construc-
tion.8 Thus, recovery was allowed a brakeman on a shifting crew,9 an
employee of a roundhouse, 10 a section laborer helping to maintain and re-
pair tracks," a car repairman 12 and a telegraph operator.' 8 However
recovery was denied an employee of a railroad's freight claim depart-
1. Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R., 227 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1955).
2. Federal Employer's Liability Act, 53 STAT. 1404 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
3. Straub v. Reading Company, 220 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1955).
4. Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Co., 39 Cal. 2d 374, 246 P.2d 642 (1952), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952). Employee was a lumber inspector for the railroad and was
inspecting railroad ties. He was held to be under the act.
5. Shanks .v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558
(1916).
6. "Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall
be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or
closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth, shall, for the pur-
poses of this Act, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce
and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this Act. . ." 53 STAT. 1404 (1908),
45 U.S.C. §51 (1952).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. Patsaw v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 56 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. La. 1944) ; Agos-
tino v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) ; But see, Thompson v.
Industrial Commission, 380 11. 386, 44 N.E.2d 19 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 693
(1943).
9. Ermin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
10. Zimmerman v. Scandrett, 57 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Wis. 1944).
11. Prader v. Pennsylvania R.R., 113 Ind. App. 518, 49 N.E.2d 387 (1943).
12. Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 19 Cal. 2d 271, 120 P.2d
880 (1942).
13. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
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ment, 14 a watchman protecting the premises from trespassers, 15 and an
employee who was injured while cutting weeds along a roadbed. 16
In the principal case, the majority of the court decided that the legis-
lative intent was to give the word "furtherance" in the first clause of the
amendment a limited interpretation since a liberal reading would make the
"directly or closely and substantially" clause useless. The majority decision
is based on this latter clause while the dissent contends that the plaintiff
is covered by the "furtherance" clause. For an effective application of the
statute, the term "commerce" must be defined. In Shanks v. Delaware
L. & W. R. R. the court said that "commerce" was to be used in a limited
sense to mean "transportation". The committee report on the amendment
stated:
"This amendment is intended to broaden the scope of the Em-
ployers' Liability Act so as to include within its provisions employees
of common carriers who, while ordinarily engaged in the transporta-
tion of interstate commerce, may be, at the time of injury, temporarily
divorced therefrom and engaged in intrastate operations." 17 (Em-
phasis supplied)
The legislative intent therefore was not to change the idea that "com-
merce" was "transportation". The amendment was evidently intended to
include those employees who at some time or other were engaged in "trans-
portation" but who at the time of injury might be engaged in other
operations. Further proof that this was to be the continued interpretation
was also set forth by those advocating the amendments.' 8 Thus, in those
cases which have allowed recovery, it was found that the employee in some
way or other was closely and substantially connected with "transportation".
To allow the plaintiff to recover in this case would open the door to recov-
ery for all railroad employees regardless of the nature of their work. The
court, by examining the legislative intent, has reached a sound result. Of
course, plaintiff's recovery is provided for under state workmen's compen-
sation statutes.
Henry A. Giuliani
14. Holl v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
15. Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 380 Ill. 386, 44 N.E.2d (1942), cert. de-
nied, 318 U.S. 755 (1943).
16. Lawrence v. Rutland R.R., 112 Vt. 523, 28 A.2d 488 (1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 693 (1943).
17. S. Rrx. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).
18. Mr. T. J. McGrath, General Counsel for the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, said in advocating its adoption, "Its application will be confined of course, to the
character of employees now covered by the present act..." Hearings Before the Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., S. 1708, at
8 (1939).
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